Discoverability of Personal Injury Surveillance and Missouri\u27s Work Product Doctrine, The by Siemens, Kenneth E.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 57 
Issue 3 Summer 1992 Article 4 
Summer 1992 
Discoverability of Personal Injury Surveillance and Missouri's 
Work Product Doctrine, The 
Kenneth E. Siemens 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth E. Siemens, Discoverability of Personal Injury Surveillance and Missouri's Work Product Doctrine, 
The, 57 MO. L. REV. (1992) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss3/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Comments




In personal injury trials a major focus is often the legitimacy of the
plaintiff's alleged injuries.' If the defendant doubts the severity of the
plaintiff's injuries, it is common practice for the defendant to hire private
investigators to conduct surveillance of the plaintiff.2 The knowledge, prior
to trial, of the existence and contents3 of any surveillance is imperative for
plaintiffs, either to substantiate the extent of injuries alleged,4 or to prepare
an argument to explain any discrepancies between the injuries alleged and
those shown by the surveillance A defendant's interest in the non-discover-
1. George A. LaMarca, Overintrusive Surveillance of Plaintiffs in Personal Injury
Cases, 9 AM. J. TRLAL ADvoc. 1, 1 (1985).
2. The likelihood surveillance exists often depends on the potential value of the
plaintiff's claim. The higher the value of the claim, the more likely surveillance exists.
However, the ease and availability of video cameras has increased the likelihood
surveillance exists in lower value cases. See generally Paul C. Ney, Jr., Videotape
Surveillance in Civil Cases, LIG., Summer 1991, at 11.
3. For an explanation of the distinction, see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., McGee v. Burlington N. Inc., 571 P.2d 784, 791-92 (Mont. 1977).
5. See, e.g., Snead v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148,
150 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Although local rules may require pretrial disclosure of all evidence and other
exhibits to be used during the trial, a plaintiff's attorney should propound written
discovery requests concerning surveillance materials, similar to the following:
Interrogatory: Do you know of any films, videotapes, photographs,
or audio tape of the plaintiff taken at any time subsequent to the accident
in question?
Interrogatory: If your answer to the previous interrogatory was "yes",
please provide the following information with respect to each film,
videotape, photograph, or audio tape:
a. Specifically what medium was used to record the activities;
b. The person who made the film, videotape, photograph, or
audio tape, including that person's employer, employer's address,
and employer's phone number;
c. The date or dates on which it was made;
1
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ability of surveillance stems from a desire to keep the plaintiff honest when
she testifies about the extent of her injuries, 6 The non-discoverability may
also prevent the plaintiff from molding her testimony to correspond with the
injuries depicted in the surveillance.7 Defendants contend the mere possibility
that surveillance exists deters exaggerations by plaintiffs.'
In support of the discovery of surveillance materials, plaintiffs argue that
"the camera may be an instrument of deception."9 Differences in lighting,
camera angles, the speed of the film, editing, and splicing could make the
surveillance misleading. 10 Plaintiffs argue that unless they can view the film
and investigate the photographer's credentials and techniques and methods
used, they are deprived of the opportunity to develop rebuttal evidence and to
fully prepare their cross-examination."
Defendants argue, however, that the main purpose of surveillance is to
impeach the plaintiff's credibility and to maintain the plaintiff's honesty
concerning injuries.1 The mere possibility that surveillance exists "will
often cause the most blatant liar to consider carefully the testimony he plans
d. The place or places at which it was made;
e. The time or times at which it was made;
f. Specifically what it depicts;
g. The person or persons, including addresses and phone
numbers, who have possession of any such items, including any
reproductions or copies of any such items.
Interrogatory: Please identify all persons who have knowledge of
discoverable facts concerning this action.
Request 'for Production: Please produce for inspection all films,
videotapes, photographs, and audio tapes of the plaintiff taken subsequent
to the accident in question.
Request for Production: Please produce for inspection all written
reports of investigators concerning any investigation made of the plaintiff
subsequent to the accident in question.
See Ney, supra note 2, at 14.
Noteworthy is Hoey v. Hawkins, 332 A.2d 403 (Del. 1975). In this case, the
plaintiff propounded an interrogatory asking the defendant to disclose the identity of
persons with knowledge of the facts at issue or of persons who had been interviewed
on the defendant's behalf. Id. at 406. The court held that the defendant had a duty
to disclose the identity of the detective who conducted surveillance as such a person,
and failure to do so should have rendered the surveillance inadmissible. Id.
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to give under oath."' 3 If a plaintiff is allowed to discover whether surveil-
lance is being used, it is possible she will alter her testimony to correspond
to the surveillance. 4 Defendants contend a plaintiff's uncertainty as to the
existence and contents of surveillance "is the best way to promote truthfulness,
and the showing of such films in court [is] a proper way to penalize a plaintiff
who has been dishonest."1t
Defendants traditionally rely on three theories to avoid the disclosure of





16. See infra notes 117, 194-96 and accompanying text; see also parts III, IV.
17. The attorney-client protection has not been successfully used to avoid
discovery of surveillance materials and is only mentioned in a few cases. In Suezaki
v. Superior Court, 373 P.2d 432, 437-38 (Cal. 1962), the California Supreme Court
held that surveillance was not a "communication" and was not protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the court stated that the surveillance was
"simply a physical object transmitted to the attorney either with or without an
accompanying report or letter of transmittal." Id. at 437. The court held that the film
could not be classified as a communication from the client to the attorney because the
films were representations of the plaintiff and not of the client. Id. at 438.
18. The pure impeachment argument generally has not been successful to avoid
the discovery of surveillance. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth
some mention.
Before discussing the argument that pure impeachment materials are immune
from discovery, some discussion of the differences between impeachment and
substantive evidence is necessary. Substantive evidence is offered for the purpose of
persuading the fact finder as to the truth of an issue on which the fact finder will be
required to render a decision. Zimmerman v. Superior Ct., 402 P.2d 212, 215 (Ariz.
1965). Impeachment evidence is designed to discredit a witness. Id. Evidence may
be substantive, impeachment, or both substantive and impeachment. Id. at 215-16.
An often made but rarely accepted argument against the disclosure of surveillance
materials is that they are purely impeachment evidence and not discoverable. Id. at
215-17.
A case concerned solely with the discoverability of pure impeachment evidence
was Boldt v. Sanders, 111 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 1961). Although not a surveillance
case, the Boldt reasoning has been used by several surveillance cases in rejecting the
pure impeachment argument. See, e.g., Martin v. Long Island R.R., 63 F.R.D. 53, 55
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Zimmerman, 402 P.2d at 216-17; Prewitt v. Beverly-50th St. Corp.,
546 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1989). In Boldt, the plaintiff brought a personal
injury action against the defendant and requested, through interrogatories, any
information the defendant had acquired about the injuries the plaintiff may have
sustained prior to the injury in question. Boldt, 111 N.W.2d at 226. The defendant
1992]
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Currently in Missouri, surveillance materials are protected as work product,
and this protection has not been overcome by a showing of substantial need
and undue hardship.19 The majority of jurisdictions hold either that
surveillance is not work product at all and is freely discoverable," or
refused to answer the question on the grounds that the information was already known
by the plaintiff and was to be used solely for impeachment purposes. Id. In refuting
the defendant's argument that impeachment evidence was not discoverable, the court
stated that the defendant's evidence itself was subject to impeachment and that the
defendant did not have a "monopoly on virtue." Id. at 227. The court stated that to
accept the defendant's argument would "be judicial retrogression undermining the
whole purpose of the rules of civil procedure." Id.
The Colorado case of Crist v. Goody, 507 P.2d 478, 480 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972),
rendered any impeachment argument in relation to surveillance inherently void of merit
when it held that surveillance materials were not impeachment evidence. The court
stated the fundamental purpose of surveillance is "providing substantive evidence
which tends to prove or disprove a factual issue in the case." Id. The court held that
because the surveillance was offered for the obvious purpose of proving the fraud in
the claims of injury by the plaintiff, its primary classification was substantive, and any
impeachment effect was subservient. Id.
A rare case accepting the pure impeachment argument was Bogatay v. Montour
Railroad, 177 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1959). In reaching its conclusion, the court
relied on the spirit of a local pretrial rule, which required the disclosure of all evidence
at a pretrial conference except non-discoverable matters, impeachment matters, and
privileged matters. Id. at 270. The court acknowledged that the surveillance might
be used as substantive evidence, but concluded that it appeared that the surveillance
in this case was better classified as impeachment evidence. Id. The court further
stated that it was for the defendant, not the court, to choose whether the surveillance
would be used for impeachment evidence or as a substantive defense. Id. It should
be noted, however, that if the defendant planned to use the evidence as substantive
evidence, the Bogatay court held it should be disclosed in pretrial. Id.
See generally State ex rel. Whitacre v. Ladd, 701 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); R.L. Martyn, Annotation, Discovery, In Civil Case, Of Material Which Is Or
May Be Designed For Use In Impeachment, 18 A.L.R.3D 922 (1968).
19. State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.
1961). See also Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01; infra notes 53, 117 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Daniels v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 110 F.R.D. 160, 161
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (existence and contents of surveillance always discoverable);
Zimmerman, 402 P.2d at 217 (existence and contents of surveillance always
discoverable); Camelback Contractors, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 608 P.2d 782, 784-
85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (existence and contents of surveillance always discoverable);
Crist, 507 P.2d at 480 (existence and contents of surveillance always discoverable);
Williams v. Dixie Elec. Power Ass'n, 514 So. 2d 332, 335-37 (Miss. 1987) (existence
and contents always discoverable); McGee v. Burlington N. Inc., 571 P.2d 784, 791-
92 (Mont. 1977) (existence and contents of surveillance always discoverable). But see
Prewitt, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 815-16 (existence of surveillance always discoverable and
[Vol. 57
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surveillance is protected as work product, but the protection is automatically
overcome because substantial need and undue hardship are inherently
present.21 These jurisdictions generally permit the defendant to depose the
plaintiff before disclosing the surveillance, but limit questions to the plaintiff's
injuries?2 Only a few jurisdictions follow Missouri and classify surveillance
contents protected as work product but inherently overcome due to undue hardship in
obtaining the substantial equivalent).
21. See, e.g., Snead v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148,
151 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (existence and contents of surveillance are protected as work
product but protection is inherently overcome by plaintiff's substantial need); Davis
v. Daddona, No. CV89 0102503 S., 1990 WL 288643, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
4, 1990) (existence and contents of surveillance protected as work product but
inherently overcome by plaintiff's substantial need); Hoey v. Hawkins, 332 A.2d 403,
406 (Del. 1974) (existence of surveillance always discoverable and contents protected
as work product which is inherently overcome by showing of good cause); In re
Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, 535 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1988); Dodson v.
Persell, 390 So. 2d 704,707 (Fla. 1980) (existence of surveillance always discoverable
and contents protected as work product, but inherently overcome if the surveillance is
used as evidence for any purpose); Sires v. National Serv. Corp., 560 So. 2d 448, 449
(La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 563 So. 2d 865 (La. 1990) (existence of surveillance
always discoverable and contents protected as work product, which is inherently
overcome if the surveillance is used as evidence for any purpose); Shenk v. Berger,
587 A.2d 551, 556 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (existence of surveillance always
discoverable and contents protected by work product, which is inherently overcome if
the surveillance is used as evidence for any purpose); Jenkins v. Rainner, 350 A.2d
473, 475-77 (N.J. 1976) (existence of surveillance always discoverable and the contents
of surveillance protected as work product, but the protection is inherently overcome
by plaintiff's substantial need); Prewitt, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 816 (existence of surveillance
always discoverable and contents protected by work product, but inherently overcome
due to undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent); Cabral v. Arruda, 556
A.2d 47,49-50 (R.I. 1989) (existence of surveillance always discoverable and contents
protected by work product, which is inherently overcome if the surveillance is to be
used as evidence for any purpose); cf Keeley v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 87
Civ. 1398, (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (existence and contents of surveillance not discoverable
due to impeaching value). But see Daniels, 110 F.R.D. at 161 (existence and contents
of surveillance always discoverable); Bogatay, 177 F. Supp. at 270 (existence and
contents of surveillance not discoverable, relying on local pretrial rule); Kriskey v.
Chestnut Hill Bus Co., No. CV87 0090900 S., 1990 WL 284343, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 9, 1990) (contents of surveillance protected by work product and protection
not overcome by plaintiff).
22. See, e.g., Daniels, 110 F.R.D. at 161 (defendant must be allowed the
opportunity to depose the plaintiff); Snead, 50 F.R.D. at 151 (must allow defendant
right to depose plaintiff); Davis, 1990 WL 288643 at *2 (must allow defendant
opportunity to depose); In re Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, 535 So. 2d
at 250 (must allow defendant opportunity to depose); Dodson, 390 So. 2d at 708 (court
19921
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as work product, and do not find that the plaintiff's substantial need and
undue hardship outweigh the work product protection.23
A distinction must be made between the discovery of the existence of
surveillance and the discovery of the contents of surveillance.2 Missouri
courts currently hold that both are protected as work product and have yet to
overcome such protection.25 Many other jurisdictions hold both the existence
and contents of surveillance freely discoverable; neither are protected as work
product.26 Other courts hold the existence of surveillance freely discoverable
and not protected as work product,27 but hold the contents of the surveillance
protected as work product.' Here, however, the work product protection is
often overcome.29 Other courts hold both the existence and contents of
surveillance protected as work product, but overcome both protections through
a finding of substantial need and undue hardship.
30
This Comment examines Missouri's current work product doctrine,"i
analyzes Missouri's treatment of surveillance as work product,32 explores the
theories used by plaintiffs to discover surveillance in other jurisdictions, 33
has discretion to allow opportunity to depose); Shenk, 587 A.2d at 556 (must allow
defendant right to depose before turning surveillance over); Williams, 514 So. 2d at
336 (must allow defendant right to depose before producing surveillance); Jenkins, 350
A.2d at 478 (must give defendant right to depose); Cabral, 556 A.2d at 50 (must allow
defendant right to depose).
23. See, e.g., Hikel v. Abousy, 41 F.R.D. 152, 155 (D. Md. 1966) (existence of
surveillance protected as work product and protection not overcome); Kriskey, 1990
WL 284343 at *2 (contents of surveillance protected as work product and protection
not overcome by plaintiff). But see Davis, 1990 WL 288643 at *1 (existence and
contents of surveillance protected as work product but protection overcome by
plaintiff's substantial need); Shenk, 587 A.2d at 556 (existence of surveillance always
discoverable and contents of surveillance protected as work product, but protection is
inherently overcome if the surveillance is used as evidence for any purpose).
24. Discovering that surveillance exists without discovering the contents of the
surveillance serves little purpose for the injured plaintiff. However, discovering
surveillance does not exist is extremely beneficial for the injured plaintiff and assures
the plaintiff that his testimony will not be challenged through surveillance of the
plaintiff's own actions.
25. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 53-110 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 111-93 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 194-277 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 57
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and suggests what treatment Missouri courts should give surveillance materials
in the futureM
II. THE WORK PRODUCT DocTRINE
A. Overview
Of the various theories used by defendants to protect surveillance from
discovery, 35 the work product doctrine has been the most successful. 36 In
Missouri, surveillance is currently protected as work product, and this
protection has not been overcome.3 7
Although the work product doctrine was initially promulgated in the 1947
United States Supreme Court case of Hiclknan v. Taylor,38 it was not until
1970 that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted Rule 26(b)(3),39
34. See infra notes 278-320 and accompanying text. For other articles dealing
with videotape surveillance, see LaMarca, supra note 1; Ney, supra note 2; Comment
on Recent Cases, Procedure - Production of Surveillance Material - Interrelationship
of Discovery and the Prevention of Fraud, 51 IowA L. REV. 765 (1966); Wanda E.
Wakefield, Annotation, Photographs Of Civil Litigant Realized By Opponent's
Surveillance As Subject To Pretrial Discovery, 19 A.L.R.4TH 1236 (1991); Martyn,
supra note 18.
35. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 117, 194-96 and accompanying text; see also parts III, IV.
37. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
38. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Prior to Hickman, some courts had implicitly
recognized that some trial preparation materials should be protected from discovery,
but formal protection was not widespread until after the Hickman decision. See
generally Larry L. McMullen & Robin V. Foster, Work Product In Missouri, 50 Mo.
L. REV. 563, 565-66 (1985). For Missouri cases recognizing this implicit protection
prior to Hickman, see, e.g., State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward, 173 S.W.2d 920,
922 (Mo. 1943); Curtis v. Indemnity Co., 37 S.W.2d 616, 625 (Mo. 1931).
39. Rule 26 provides:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwise limited by order
of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows: ...
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provision of
subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents
and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
1992]
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which covered the work product doctrine in federal courts. ° Many states
followed by revising their work product rule or by enacting a work product
rule. Work product is defined as any notes, working papers, memoranda
or similar materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation.4
It includes mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning litigation.43 The test
most courts use to determine whether materials are prepared "in anticipation
of litigation or for trial" is whether "in the light of the nature of the document
and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said
to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation."
44
Courts generally include investigators and other agents as representatives of
the party protected under the work product doctrine.4 5 Although the federal
by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party.
Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing
a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court
order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic,
mechanical, electrical, or other recording or a transcription thereof, which
is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making
it and contemporaneously recorded.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
40. For a general history of the federal work product doctrine, see Cabral v.
Arruda, 556 A.2d 47, 48-49 (R.I. 1989).
41. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5, at 387 n.6 (1985).
Missouri revised its work product provision in 1970 and again in 1975. See infra
notes 111-112 and accompanying text. For a list of different states' variations of the
work product doctrine, see 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACtiCE AND PROCEDURE § 2022 n.98 (1991).
42. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1606 (6th
ed. 1990).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
44. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 2024. See also State ex rel. Day v.
Patterson, 773 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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rule refers only to documents and tangible materials, there is little doubt today
that the work product protection extends to unwritten as well as written
information.
There are two levels of protection afforded under the work product
doctrine.47 The "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of an attorney or other representatives of a party concerning litigation"' are
given an absolute protection from discovery.4 9 Materials prepared "in
anticipation of trial,"50 however, are not given complete protection against
discovery; rather, the materials are given quasi-protection that may be
overcome by a showing of substantial need for the materials and an undue
hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent.5' In jurisdictions that hold
surveillance materials as work product, they are generally classified as
"materials prepared in anticipation of trial;" therefore, the work product
protection may be overcome only by making this kind of showing.52
At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the
attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and
prepare his client's case. But the doctrine is an intensely practical one,
grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those
realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators
and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It
is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents
for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself.
Id. See also Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 967 (1950); Ownby v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Okla. 1968).For
cases not extending the work product protection to parties other than the attorney, see
Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1968); Whitaker v. Davis, 45
F.R.D. 270, 272-73 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
46. FRiEDENTHAL, supra note 41, § 7.5. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); infra
notes 65-70 and accompanying text. Many jurisdictions include diagrams, maps,
drawings, and movies as materials which may classify for work product protection.
See, e.g., Suezaki v. Superior Ct., 373 P.2d 432 (Cal. 1962); State ex reL St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1961). Other states define work
product more narrowly. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Superior Ct., 402 P.2d 212 (Ariz.
1965).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The text of the Rule appears supra note 39.




52. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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B. Missouri's Work Product Doctrine
1. Classification
Like the federal rule, Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01(b)(3) 5'
provides two levels of work product protection. Mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative
of a party are absolutely protected from discovery.54 Documents and
tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial are protected,
but discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the
substantial equivalent without undue hardship.55 In Missouri, surveillance
materials are generally classified as tangibles prepared in anticipation of
litigation;56 therefore, they can only be discovered upon a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship.57
53. Rule 56.01(b)(3) provides:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this Rule 56.01 [facts
and opinions held by experts], a party may obtain discovery of documents
and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this
Rule 56.01 and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative, including his
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent, only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing
has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party.
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is: (a) a
written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person
making it, or (b) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, audio, video, motion
picture or other recording, or a transcription thereof, of the party or of a
statement made by the party and contemporaneously recorded.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
54. Id.
55. Id. For an excellent discussion of Missouri's work product doctrine and its
mechanics, see McMullen & Foster, supra note 38.
56. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 57
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There are four requirements that must be met for materials to be
classified as work product in Missouri.58 The materials must be (1) docu-
ments and tangible things;59 (2) otherwise discoverable under 56.01(b)(1); 6 °
(3) prepared by or for a party or that party's representative;6' and (4)
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.' If any one of these
requirements is not met, the materials are not work product and are freely
discoverable. 63 If all the requirements are met, the materials are classified
as work product and may be discovered only upon a showing of substantial
need and undue hardship. 64
Documents and tangible items afforded work product status include
photographs of the scene of an accident,65 incident reports,6' surveillance
films,67 maps, 68 diagrams,"' and drawings. The "Otherwise disoverable
under 56.01(b)(1) " provision simply means a determination as to work
product status is not necessary if the materials are privileged from discov-
ery. 2 Privileges that may apply to materials potentially protected as work
product include the attorney-client privilege, 73 insurer-insured privilege, 74
58. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3). See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see
also McMullen & Foster, supra note 38, at 576.






65. Porter v. Gottschall, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 63, 64-65 (Mo. 1981). See infra note
139 and accompanying text.
66. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Ryan, 699 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
67. State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo.
1961). See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
68. See State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Flynn, 257 S.W.2d 69,
74 (Mo. 1953) (dicta).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 53.
72. If the materials are privileged, then there is no need to determine whether the
materials are work product or not, because the privilege prevents disclosure under all
circumstances, regardless of the materials' classification as work product.
73. See State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 386 (Mo.
1978); see generally McMullen & Foster, supra note 38, at 571.
74. See State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50,52 (Mo. 1976); see generally
McMullen & Foster, supra note 38, at 571.
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husband-wife privilege,75  physician-patient privilege, 76  priest-penitent
privilege,"n and accountant-client privilege. 7' Attempts to use other
privileges to protect surveillance materials from discovery have generally been
unsuccessful. 79
Rule 56.01(b)(3) specifically includes a party's attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent as persons qualified to cloak materials
with the work product classification. Missouri courts consistently have
included investigators and other agents who assist in the compilation of trial
preparation materials in this category.81 However, the attorney, representa-
tive, or agent must be working on the client's behalf to invoke the protec-
tion.'
To determine whether the materials have been prepared "in anticipation
of litigation or for trial,"83 the test is "whether 'in light of the nature of the
document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can
fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation.""' Factors courts commonly examine to determine whether the
materials were created in anticipation of litigation or for trial include:s
whether the materials have a business purpose aside from assisting with
litigation;8 the time the materials were created; 7 the individual who created'
75. See generally McMullen & Foster, supra note 38, at 571-72.
76. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(5) (Supp. 1991); see generally McMullen &
Foster, supra note 38, at 572.
77. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(4) (Supp. 1991); see generally McMullen &
Foster, supra note 38, at 572.
78. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 326.151 (1986); see generally McMullen & Foster,
supra note 38, at 572.
79. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
80. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
81. Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975)).
82. See State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434 S.W.2d 532, 535-36
(Mo. 1968).
83. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
84. State ex rel. Day v. Patterson, 773 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
85. For a detailed discussion on these factors, see generally McMullen & Foster,
supra note 38, at 578-82.
86. See In re Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Spinden, 798 S.W.2d
472, 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (investigative information complied by the state board
while investigating a disciplinary complaint was compiled in the ordinary course of
business and not in anticipation of litigation; therefore, the information was not work
product); St. Louis Little Rock Hosp. v. Gaertner, 682 S.W.2d 146, 151 (Mo. Ct. App.
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the materials;8 and the time lapse from the event giving rise to the cause of
action and the creation of the materials.89
2. Substantial Need and Undue Hardship
There is little guidance in Missouri as to what is necessary to overcome
the work product protection afforded trial preparation materials. Rule
56.01(b)(3) states the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a substantial
need for the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent.' The Missouri
courts have yet to delineate what is necessary to meet the substantial need and
undue hardship requirement. 91
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District in May Depart-
ment Stores Co. v. Ryan92 provides some insight. In May, the desired
document was an incident report filled out by an employee of May Company
after a customer was detained on suspicion of shoplifting.93 The report was
subsequently delivered to the May Company's insurer.94 The court classified
the report as work product and found no substantial need or undue hard-
1984) (holding the incident report was prepared in the ordinary course of business and
not in anticipation of litigation, therefore not work product).
87. See State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Flynn, 257 S.W.2d 69,
75 (Mo. 1953) (photos taken after event which gave rise to litigation). But see State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Jensen, 362 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Mo. 1962) (reports
prepared before commencement of action).
88. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22,
24-25 (Mo. 1961).
89. See, e.g., State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward, 173 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo.
1943).
90. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3). See supra note 53.
91. See, e.g., McMullen & Foster, supra note 38, at 584-85. The authors
suggested several key factors which should influence the courts. These included: (1)
the date the requested item was created relative to the cause of action-the closer to
the liability-creating event, the more likely it will be held unique; (2) the availability
of alternative sources including reasonable access to witnesses, non-protected
documents, and other items which could substitute for the requested item; (3) the
requesting party's trial preparation and whether they had the same opportunity to
discover the evidence; (4) the uniqueness of the evidence, for example, photographs,
tape recordings, and documentation of destroyed evidence; (5) the passage of time
since the evidence in question was recorded. Id.
92. 699 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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ship.95 The court stated, "Here the plaintiff seeks a report concerning an
incident about which she herself can testify. There is no showing that
defendant Lutz, who prepared the report, is unavailable. Plaintiff has




The May court distinguished the facts of this case from those in Porter
v. Gottschall, Inc.,9 in which the court found sufficient substantial need and
undue hardship to overcome the work product protection.98 In Porter, the
plaintiff sought discovery of photographs taken by the defendant of the scene
of the accident.' Specific factors that influenced the Porter court's decision
to permit discovery included: (1) the trial was six and one-half years after the
accident;' ° (2) the photos were of the accident scene and the automobiles
involved in the accident;... (3) the plaintiff had been incompetent since'the
accident and was unable to give an account of what happened;'02 (4) the
defendant died before the trial;103 (5) these were the only photographs that
could have shown the position of the vehicles after the accident, the debris on
the road, and possibly the skid marks;1°4 and (6) the photos in question may
very well have been the best evidence of what occurred. 05
These two cases seemingly indicate that the substantial need and undue
hardship finding is dependent on several factors. These factors include the
knowledge of the party seeking to overcome the work product protection
concerning the contents of that item,1°6 the availability of the preparer of the
item sought to be deposed or to testify,0 7 the time lapse between the event
giving rise to the liability and the trial,1°8 the availability of substitutes to
95. Id. at 137. The court also found the document privileged as attorney-client
communication; therefore, even if the required showing had bedn met, the document
would not have been discoverable. Id.
96. Id.
97. 615 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1981). See infra note 136; part l1I.B.
98. May, 699 S.W.2d at 137 (citing Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 65).
99. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 64-65.
100. Id. at 66.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 64.
104. Id. at 66.
105. Id.
106. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 66; May, 699 S.W.2d at 137.
107. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 66; May, 699 S.W.2d at 137.
108. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 66; May, 699 S.W.2d at 137.
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the desired items,'09 and the importance of the desired items to the issues of
the trial. 1
III. MISSOURI'S TREATMENT OF SURVEILLANCE
A. The McMillian Case
Prior to 1975, work product was privileged and not discoverable in
Missouri.' Under the old rule, the party desiring discovery could not inquire
"'as to the contents or substance of statements, written or oral, obtained from
prospective witnesses by or on behalf of another party."" 2 The old rule
also provided that any writing prepared or obtained in anticipation of litigation
or in preparation for trial by the adverse party's attorney, surety, indemnitor
or agent was privileged and not discoverable." 3  An early case expressly
stated, "the discovery of confidential communications, oral or written, between
an attorney and his client with reference to ... litigation pending or
contemplated, cannot be compelled at the instance of a third party."" 4 It
was under this old rule that the current surveillance case law was decided.'
15
McMillian, decided under the old rule, represents the most current case
law concerning the discoverability of surveillance material in Missouri." 6
109. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 66; May, 699 S.W.2d at 137.
110. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 66; May, 699 S.W.2d at 137.
111. See Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 65; In re Board of Registration for the Healing
Arts v. Spinden, 798 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Highway & Transp.
Comm'n v. Anderson, 759 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Enke v. Anderson,
733 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 406
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
The word "privileged" is used to denote absolute protection from discovery. See
Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01. Privileged materials are not discoverable, regardless of the
showing by the party desiring discovery. Id. Quasi-privileged or "protected" materials
are discoverable if the discovering party is able to demonstrate substantial need and
undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent. Id.
112. Halford, 558 S.W.2d at 406 (quoting from the pre-1975 Mo. R. Civ. P.
57.01(b)).
113. Id.
114. State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Flynn, 257 S.W.2d 69, 73
(Mo. 1953).
115. State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.
1961).
116. Although the holding of McMillian was questioned in Porter v. Gottschall,
Inc., 615 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo. 1981), it was not overruled by Porter. See infra note
158 and part III.B.
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The McMillian court held surveillance protected as work product and not
discoverable.11
7
In McMillian, the plaintiff brought a personal injury suit against the
defendant and propounded interrogatories asking whether any surveillance
existed and, if so, requested production of such surveillance."' The
defendant objected to the interrogatory on the grounds that any surveillance
would be protected as work product." 9 The trial court overruled the
defendant's objections as to the existence of any surveillance, but sustained
the objection as to production of such surveillance.1 2° In response, the
defendant filed a petition for prohibition with the Missouri Supreme
Court.121
The Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged, without discussion, the
relevancy of the surveillance to the issue of injury and quickly focused on the
issue of work product privilege. 22 The court discussed at some length a
previous Missouri Supreme Court decision, State ex rel. Terminal Railroad
Ass'n v. Flynn.'23 Flynn involved photographs of the scene of an accident
taken before the plaintiff was removed from the scene; it did not involve
surveillance photos. 24 The plaintiff filed a motion requesting the defendant
to produce these photographs, and the defendant objected to the request based
on the work product doctrine.'25 The Flynn court held that the photographs
were work product and not subject to discovery. 2 6
Relying on the logic of Flynn, the court in McMillian held that "any
existing photographs or movies taken of plaintiff by defendant since the date
of her alleged injury would clearly be privileged as a work product." 2 7
Although agreeing with the holding in Flynn, the court distinguished the facts
of this case from Flynn and stated, "[T]here is no question here [as there was
A recent surveillance case, Erbschloe v. General Motors Corp., 823 S.W.2d 117
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992), explored the ability to discover surveillance as a party's own
statement, but did not address discovery of surveillance through a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship. See infra notes 173-85 and part III.C.
117. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d at 25.




122. Id. at 24.
123. 257 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1953).
124. Id. at 70.
125. Id. at 70-71.
126. Id. at 75.
127. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d at 25.
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in Flynn] concerning photographs of a place of injury."" The difference
in facts between the McMillian case (surveillance photos of the plaintiff) and
the Flynn case (photos of the scene of the accident) led the McMillian court
to conclude surveillance photos were more obviously protected as work
product than the photos of the scene of the accident.' 29 The court deter-
mined this because the surveillance "could have been taken for only one
possible purpose, namely, in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for
trial. 30  The court confined its opinion to surveillance materials only.'3
Lending indirect support to the holding, the McMillian court also noted
that if a party is in possession of all the facts, discovery serves no legitimate
purpose other than to pry into an adversary's trial preparation. 3 2 The court
further stated that the production of evidence that would be material only by
way of impeachment had been refused in earlier cases."'
In summary, the McMillian court held that the existence of surveillance
photographs was protected as work product, 3 4 and the contents of surveil-
lance photographs were protected as work product and need not be pro-
duced. 35 Although the court relied in part on the logic of Flynn, the court
distinguished the facts of Flynn from those of McMillian and stated that its




131. Id. at 26.
132. Id. (citing State ex rel. Laughlin v. Sartorius, 119 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. 1938)).
This is essentially the pure impeachment argument discussed earlier. See supra note
18.
133. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d at 26 (citing State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Hall, 27 S.W.2d 1027 (Mo. 1930)). The court recognized that Hall was decided prior
to the adoption of the then present discovery rules but concluded that the difference
would have no effect in this case. Id. The court specifically stated that "the
broadened provision of Rule 57.01(b) permitting inquiries which might be 'reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible-evidence' would have no pertinence
here." Id.
134. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 117, 127 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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B. The Porter Case
In 1975, the adoption of Rule 56.01(b)(3) 137 permitted the discovery of
work product if the discovering party demonstrated a substantial need for the
item and was unable to obtain the substantial equivalent without undue
hardship. 38 It was under this new discovery provision that Porter v.
Gottschall, Inc.139 was decided.
In Porter, the Missouri Supreme Court held that photos of an accident
scene and of automobiles involved in it were work product because they were
taken in anticipation of litigation. 14° The photos, however, were discover-
able because of the plaintiff's substantial need and undue hardship."'
The facts of Porter are similar to those in Flynn.'4' In Porter the
plaintiff brought a personal injury action and filed interrogatories asking if any
photos existed of the scene or the vehicles involved in the accident.14 3 The
interrogatory also requested the production of any photos that existed.'"
The defendant initially answered "no" to the interrogatory but later was
granted leave to amend his answer to "yes" the day of the trial. 4 ' The
defendant then produced only one photograph of the defendant's vehicle and
claimed, relying on the holding of Flynn, that the additional requested
photographs were protected as work product.146 The trial court denied the
plaintiff's request to order production, and the Missouri Supreme Court elected
to hear the appeal. 47 The court held that the adoption of a new Missouri
Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.01(b)(3),' 48 changed the work product
protection from an absolute protection, as it was under Flynn and McMillian,
to a limited protection. 49 This limited protection could be overcome by
137. See supra note 53 for the text of Mo. R. CIv. PRO. 56.01(b)(3).
138. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Mo. R. Civ. P.
56.01(b)(3).
139. 615 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1981).
140. Id. at 65.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
143. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 64-65.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 65.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra note 137.
149. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 65 ("Rule 56.01(b)(3), with the 'force and effect of
law,' now permits the discovery of tangible items prepared in anticipation of litigation,
including photographs, if substantial need for the items and an inability to obtain the
substantial equivalent without undue hardship are shown.").
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demonstrating a substantial need for the items and an inability to obtain the
equivalent without undue hardship.'50
Several factors weighed in the court's conclusion that the plaintiff had
demonstrated a substantial need for the photos. These factors included the
substantial time lapse between the accident and the trial.15' In addition, the
photos had a direct relation to the cause of action,' neither party could
testify as to what happened, 53 and the photos were the only evidence of the
position of the vehicles after the accident, the debris on the road, and the skid
marks.
154
The holding of Porter is similar to that of Flynn in that both held photos
of the accident scene were work product. 55 When Flynn was decided,
however, work product was absolutely protected. 56 The Porter decision,
decided under a new Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure, held the work product
immunity was overcome by the plaintiff's showing of substantial need and
inability to obtain the substantial equivalent.5 7 The Porter court stated that
to the extent Flynn and McMillian were inconsistent with the new Missouri
Rule of Civil Procedure, they were not to be followed.'5s The similarities
between the facts of Flynn and Porter leads to the conclusion that Flynn
would have been decided differently under the new work product provision,
which allowed the work product protection to be overcome by a showing of
substantial need and inability to obtain the substantial equivalent.' It is
unclear, however, if McMillian's result would have been different under the
new rule."6
The McMillian case, in contrast to Flynn and Porter, did not involve
photos of the scene of the accident; rather, it involved surveillance photo-
graphs taken of the plaintiff away from the scene of the accident.' The
150. Id.
151. Id. at 66.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 64, 66.
154. Id. at 66.
155. Id. at 64-66. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
157. Porter, 615 S.W.2d at 66.
158. Id. at 65.
159. On the other hand, unusual circumstances surrounding the Porter case,
including the lack of witnesses, a long time lapse between the accident and litigation,
the defendant's inability to testify, and the plaintiff's inability to testify, may be such
that the substantial need was present in Porter but would not have been found in
Flynn.
160. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
161. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d at 26.
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McMillian court stated, "We are dealing here with a rather limited class of
photographs, those sometimes called 'surveillance' photographs. Our decision
is confined to the specific issues presented here." 6'
Because the McMillian court did not address the substantial need of the
plaintiff, it cannot be assumed the court would not have found such need.
163
However, the court in McMillian may have indicated no such need existed
when it stated, "[n]o legitimate purpose of discovery is served by inquiries
'which merely pry into an adversary's preparation for trial; and the discovery
procedure has not been formulated for the benefit of a litigant who is already
in possession of all the facts."'" Given the lack of guidance as to what is
necessary to meet the required showing of need and hardship, any prediction
as to whether the work product protection is overcome in a typical surveil-
lance situation, such as McMillian, is difficult at best.
165
C. Missouri Amendment Opens Door for New Argument
In 1990 the Missouri work product rule, 56.01(b)(3) was amended.'6
This amendment provides an opportunity for a new argument for the discovery
of surveillance materials. A "statement previously made" by the party
"concerning the action or its subject matter" may be obtained by that party
"without the required showing." 167 A statement previously made has been
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 111-36 and accompanying text.
164. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d at 26.
165. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 292-312
and accompanying text.
166. Rule 56.01(b)(3) originally read:
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party.
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (a) a written
statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making
it, or (b) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3) (Vernon 1975).
The amendment changed the last sentence of this subdivision to read:
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (a) a written
statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making
it, or (b) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, audio, video, motion picture
or other recording, or a transcription thereof, of the party or of a statement
made by the party and contemporaneously recorded.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
167. Mo. R. CIv. P. 56.01(b)(3).
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amended to include "audio, video, motion picture or other recording... of the
party."1'8 Therefore, it may be argued that the intent of the legislature was
to allow for the discovery of surveillance as a video or motion picture
statement of the party.
A similar argument was made successfully in a New York state case,
Saccente v. Toterhi.169 In Saccente, the plaintiff sought to discover photo-
graphs taken by the defendants' insurance carrier a short time after the
accident and before the infant plaintiff had retained an attorney. 70 The
court held that photographs taken as surveillance "properly fall within the
terms ... which provide: 'A party may obtain a copy of his own state-
ment. ' " 71 It is important to note, however, that the plaintiff had granted the
defendant permission to take the photographs.72
Recently, a Missouri appellate court refused to interpret a workers'
compensation statute allowing a party to discover his own statement to include
a silent surveillance film of the worker. 73 In Erbschloe v. General Motors
Corp., the employee was denied his claim for workers' compensation for his
back injury.74 The employee testified that he still experienced severe and
constant pain in his back and that he could not stand, sit or walk for extended
periods of time. 75 The employee further testified that he could not bend
over or raise his arms above his head.176 The employer then produced a
168. Id.
169. 314 N.Y.S.2d 593 (App. Div. 1970).
170. Id. at 594.
171. Id.
172. Id. The granting of permission for the photographs makes them appear more
like a traditional "statement of the party" than covert surveillance photographs.
173. Erbschloe v. General Motors Corp., 823 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992). The statutory language interpreted in Erbschloe was a workers' compensation
statute. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.215 (1986). Section 287.215 provides:
No statement in writing made or given by an injured employee, whether
taken and transcribed by a stenographer, signed or unsigned by the injured
employee, or any statement which is mechanically or electronically
recorded, or taken in writing by another person, or otherwise preserved,
shall be admissible in evidence, used or referred to in any manner at any
hearing or action to recover benefits under this law unless a copy thereof
is given or furnished the employee, or his dependents in case of death, or
their attorney, within fifteen days after written request for it by the injured
employee, his dependents in case of death, or by their attorney. The
request shall be directed to the employer or its insurer by certified mail.
Id.
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surveillance videotape that directly contradicted the employee's conten-
tions.'" Prior to the hearing, the employee requested production of all
statements and other evidence pursuant to the workers' compensation statute
providing for discovery of a party's own statement. 78 The employer did not
produce the videotape at that time and attempted to admit the surveillance
only after the employee testified.'7 9 The trial judge admitted the surveil-
lance over the employee's objections. 88 The court of appeals held that the
surveillance tape did not properly fall within the workers' compensation
statute, which allowed discovery of a party's own statement.1
8 1
Although there are substantial differences in the language of the workers'
compensation statute and the general discovery provision of 56.01,182 the
court in Erbschloe stated there was no authority that videotaped surveillance,
with no audio portion, constituted a statement.'83 The Erbschloe court also
mentioned that the videotaped surveillance was valuable in determining the
credibility of the witness, 84 and the surveillance was admissible to impeach
the employee's testimony and reduce his recovery.'85 The concurring
opinion in Erbschloe offers some insight into the approach a court may take
concerning Rule 56.01(b)(3).8 The concurring judge relied on Black's Law
Dictionary, which defined "statement" as "[a]n oral or written assertion, or
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."1
8 7
The concurring judge in Erbschloe thought the surveillance failed to meet this
definition because the employee was not aware the surveillance was being
conducted; therefore, the employee could not have intended such conduct to
be an assertion."8
177. Id.
178. Id. See supra note 5.
179. Erbschloe, 823 S.W.2d at 118.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 119.
182. Missouri Revised Statute § 287.215 (1986) does not specifically mention
video or motion picture statements of the party. Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure
56.01(b)(3) expressly defines a statement previously made as including video and
motion pictures of the party or of a statement made by the party. See supra notes 53,
173.
If § 287.215 had contained language specifically defining a party's statement to
include video or motion picture statements of the party, the court may have decided
the case differently.
183. Erbschloe, 823 S.W.2d at 119.
184. Id.
185. Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
186. Erbschloe, 823 S.W.2d at 119.
187. BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 1408 (6th ed. 1990).
188. Erbschloe, 823 S.W.2d at 119.
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Those opposed to the discovery of surveillance will argue that the
legislature did not intend for the new amendment to allow discovery of
surveillance. They will argue the amendment was intended solely as a
technological update, allowing a party to obtain a statement that he made,
which could have been written, but instead was recorded via video. Although
legislative history is not recorded in Missouri, this view is supported by the
cover of Senate Bill 161, the bill that contained the amendment to Rule
56.01.189 The language, "mechanically reproduced records,"' 9 indicates
the legislature probably did not intend to increase the scope of the statute
except to allow for a technological update.
This interpretation, however, is not supported by a literal reading of the
new language in the statute. The amendment specifically provides that a
statement previously made is a "video ... of the party" or a "video ... of a
statement made by the party and contemporaneously recorded."'' A "video
... of a statement made by the party and contemporaneously recorded"'92
is clearly a technological update. Therefore, the language a "video ... of the
party"'9 3 must mean something other than a technological update.
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' TREATMENT OF SURVEILLANCE
Courts have differed in their classification of surveillance with regard to
the work product doctrine. Some courts hold surveillance is not work product
at all and is freely discoverable.' 94 Other courts classify surveillance as
work product, but the protection is overcome by the plaintiff's showing of
substantial need and undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equiva-
lent.'95 Still other courts, including Missouri, classify surveillance materials
as work product, but do not find the required showing of substantial need and
undue hardship to overcome the protection."
189. The cover reads, "To repeal section 510.030, RSMO 1986, and enact in lieu
thereof one new section and to amend supreme court rule 56.01 for the purpose of
allowing certain mechanically reproduced records to be used in courts of law."
190. See supra note 189 (emphasis added).
191. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; infra note 197 and accompanying
text.
195. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; infra note 211 and accompanying
text.
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A. Surveillance Not Work Product
Several jurisdictions afford surveillance materials no work product
protection at all and allow discovery of both the existence and contents of the
surveillance freely. 97
The "not work product" classification is best illustrated by an Arizona
case, Zimmerman v. Superior Court.198 In holding that' surveillance did not
constitute work product, the Zimmerman court held surveillance would not fall
within Arizona's definition of work product,199 which included "memoranda,
briefs and writings prepared by counsel for his own use."2' The
Zimmerman court distinguished its holding from Missouri's most current case
on surveillance, McMillian,"1 when it noted Missouri defined work product
more broadly than Arizona. 202  The court stated Missouri included "dia-
grams, maps and drawings" as work product and that Arizona did not include
such items in its definition.20 3 The court likened the surveillance to state-
197. For a detailed discussion on Missouri's current case law, see part III; see
also Daniels v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 110 F.R.D. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (right
to depose before disclosure); Zimmerman v. Superior Ct., 402 P.2d 212 (Ariz. 1965);
Camelback Contractors, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 608 P.2d 782 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980); Crist v. Goody, 507 P.2d 478 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Olszewski v. Howell, 253
A.2d 77 (Del. 1969) (must show good cause to discover surveillance); Williams v.
Dixie Elec. Power Ass'n, 514 So. 2d 332(Miss. 1987); McGee v. Burlington N. Inc.,
571 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1977). But see Prewitt v. Beverly-50th St. Corp., 546 N.Y.S.2d
815 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (existence of surveillance always discoverable and contents
protected as work product but inherently overcome due to undue hardship in obtaining
the substantial equivalent).
The Zimmerman case is the only one of these cases which discusses the reason
surveillance is not classified as work product. The other listed cases decide
surveillance is not work product summarily without discussion.
198. 402 P.2d 212 (Ariz. 1965).
199. Id. at 215. The Arizona definition of work product in Zimmerman was
"memoranda, briefs and writings prepared by counsel for his own use, as well as
related writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or legal theories." Id. at 214 (citing Dean v. Superior Ct., 324 P.2d 764, 769 (Ariz.
1958)).
200. Id.
201. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. McMillian held surveillance was
classified as work product. State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351
S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. 1961).
202. Zimmerman, 402 P.2d at 215. Missouri has continued to define work
product broadly. Even documents prepared for one case have been afforded work
product status in a later case. State ex rel. Day v. Patterson, 773 S.W.2d 224, 228
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
203. Zimmerman, 402 P.2d at 215.
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ments of witnesses obtained by the attorney or to other exhibits prepared by
the attorney that are not classified as work product in Arizona.'
A similar conclusion was reached by a Delaware court in Olszewski v.
Howell.205 The court cited several factors that influenced' its refusal to
afford surveillance work product protection.2 6 First, the court held the
surveillance was unique and could not be reproduced.207 Second, the court
noted the potential for misleading surveillance due to the many variables
involved.m Third, the court noted the policy of pretrial disclosure is based
on a searchfor truth and justice.2' Finally, the court held that disclosure
would expedite the case and encourage settlement.10
B. Surveillance as Work Product and Discoverable
Several courts classify surveillance as work product, but find the
protection has been overcome by a showing of substantial need and undue
hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent.21 Within the classification
"work product and discoverable" there are three categories.
1. Category One
The first category holds: 1) the existence of surveillance is protected as
work product, but the protection is overcome due to the plaintiff's substantial
need and undue hardship;2 12 2) the contents of surveillance are protected as
work product but the protection is overcome if the surveillance is to be used
as evidence for any purpose;21 3 and 3) the right to depose the plaintiff as to
his injuries is allowed before the defendant is required to turn the contents of
the surveillance over to the plaintiff.
214
204. Id.
205. 253 A.2d 77 (Del. 1969). The Olszewski factual background was somewhat
unique in that the plaintiff made no claims that she could not engage in certain





210. Id. But see infra note 273 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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The courts within this category find the substantial need to discover the
existence of surveillance material overcomes the work product protection.1
The courts base their decisions on the unique nature of surveillance films and
the likelihood of unfair surprise.216 In discussing the need of the plaintiff
to know whether surveillance existed, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Snead v. American Export-Isvrandtsen
Lines, Inc: stated:
Of course, surveillance motion pictures are not available except from
the one who took them. While in theory, the plaintiff may tell his attorney
about his physical limitations and demonstrate what he can and cannot do,
obviously such descriptions would be of fragmentary help in trying to know
what a hidden camera had recorded at some unknown time. A man may
know he cannot bend over without pain and therefore feel he is telling the
truth when he says he never reaches down to touch the floor. Nonetheless,
under some particular circumstances he may have done so and this may be
the very incident which the camera has recorded.217
The court balanced the plaintiff's need to know against the defendant's need
to keep the surveillance's existence hidden. 8 The court acknowledged that
the only time there was a substantial need to know about the existence of
surveillance materials was when there was a major discrepancy between the
injuries alleged and those depicted, 29 and that the same circumstance was
the only instance in which the defendant would have a substantial need to
withhold the information.20 If the discrepancies were the result of an
215. Snead v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Davis v. Daddona, No. CV89 0102503 S., 1990 WL 288643 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 4, 1990); Sires v. National Serv. Corp., 560 So. 2d 448 (La. Ct. App. 1990);
Collins v. Crosby Group, Inc., 551 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Shenk v. Berger,
587 A.2d 551 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Prewitt v. Beverly-50th St. Corp., 546
N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
216. See, e.g., Snead, 59 F.R.D at 151; Davis, 1990 WL 299643 at *1; Sires, 560
So. 2d at 449; Collins, 551 So. 2d at 44; Shenk, 587 A.2d at 551; Prewitt, 546
N.Y.S.2d at 816.
217. Snead, 59 F.R.D. at 150-51. In this case the plaintiff asked through
interrogatories whether the surveillance existed, and if so, all the details surrounding
them. Id. at 149. The Snead case is the pioneer case within this category and has
been adopted in conclusory fashion by most of the other cases within this category.
See, e.g., Davis, 1990 WL 288643 at *1; Sires, 560 So. 2d at 449; Collins, 551 So. 2d
at 44; Shenk, 587 A.2d at 551; Prewitt, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
218. Snead, 59 F.R.D. at 151.
219. Id. But see McGee v. Burlington N. Inc., 571 P.2d 784, 791-92 (Mont.
1977).
220. Snead; 59 F.R.D. at 151. But see McGee, 571 P.2d at 791-92.
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untruthful plaintiff, the substantial need of the plaintiff would not justify
overcoming the work product protection.22' If, on the other hand, the
discrepancies were the result of misleading photography, the substantial need
of the plaintiff would overcome the work product protection.2 Recognizing
the conflicting interests of the plaintiff and defendant, and realizing that it was
not possible to predict the reasons for the discrepancies, the court relied on the
major objectives of discovery, which were to obtain a just and speedy
determination of cases.m2 The Snead court thought these objectives were
best achieved by allowing discovery of the existence of surveillance.' The
contents of the surveillance must be disclosed only if the defendant decides
to use the films at trial.225 Although the holding was conclusory, 2 6 it is
likely the court reasoned that if the surveillance was not to be used at trial, the
need of the plaintiff to discover the surveillance is not present.
The Snead court was one of the first to make the right to depose the
plaintiff as to his injuries a condition before the defendant was required to
acknowledge the existence of the surveillance. 27 This right to depose has
been followed in a number of jurisdictions.2
2. Category Two
The second category within the "work product and discoverable" category
holds: 1) the existence of surveillance is freely discoverable and not work
product; 29 2) the contents of surveillance are protected as work product,
but the protection is overcome due to the plaintiff's substantial need and
undue hardship;-  and 3) the right to depose the plaintiff as to his injuries
is permitted before the defendant is required to turn over the contents of the






227. Id. For an extension of this right to depose the plaintiff, see, e.g., Blyther
v. Northern Lines, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 610, 611-12 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (the right to depose
extends beyond the plaintiff to anyone whose deposition would furnish a reasonable
degree of protection for the defendant as to the certainty of the events depicted in the
surveillance).
228. See supra note 22.
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surveillance. 23'
This approach is best represented by the New Jersey case Jenkins v.
Rainner.232 The court found a substantial need 40 discover the contents was
present because the surprise that resulted from distortion or misidentification
was inherently unfair.233 If the surveillance was unleashed at trial, the
plaintiff would not have an opportunity to avoid the irreparable resulting
damage.' The court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff
had no substantial need to view the surveillance because she knew the extent
of her injuries better than anyone else. s5 It stated that the defendant's
evidence was not the "exclusive repository of truth and virtue."''  The court
recognized the needs of the defendant to use the surveillance to counter the
plaintiff's alleged injuries. 7 If the plaintiff lied, however, the court thought
the use of depositions to memorialize her testimony as to the extent of her
injuries would suffice in keeping the plaintiff from salvaging her case.23'
In finding the necessary undue hardship, the court held that surveillance -
was unique and could not be recreated. 239 The court stated that because the
surveillance was unique and a party could not copy or otherwise recreate it,
the hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent was manifest."4 The
court ruled out the use of any substitutes to the surveillance film because there
was no substitute for the tremendous impact of the movie.241
231. Id. See also Martin v. Long Island R.R., 63 F.R.D. 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. Rptr. 54 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Jenkins v. Rainner, 350 A.2d 473 (N.J. 1976); Cabral v. Arruda, 556 A.2d 47
(R.I. 1989).
232. 350 A.2d 473 (N.J. 1976). For other cases with similar holdings under this
category, see Martin, 63 F.R.D. 53; Cabral, 556 A.2d 47. Cabral differs from this
holding somewhat in that it held that if the surveillance materials were created solely
for the attorney's own use, the qualified work product protection was not inherently
overcome. Id. at 50-51; see also Suezaki v. Superior Ct., 373 P.2d 432, 438-39 (Cal.
1962) (the court classified only the contents as work product and allowed the trial
court discretion to determine if the necessary showing was made); Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 25 Cal. Rptr. at 57 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
the discovery of the contents of the surveillance).
233. Jenkins, 350 A.2d at 477.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 476-77.
236. Id. at 477.
237. Id.
238. Id. See also Martin v. Long Island R.R., 63 F.R.D. 53,55 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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In exchange for making the surveillance film available to the plaintiff, the
court allowed the defendant to depose the plaintiff, but limited the deposition
to the issue of injuries. 2  The court held that where possible, any demand
for surveillance by the plaintiff should be accompanied by a consent to be
deposed after the surveillance was finished but before answering the discovery
request.243 The court recognized that deviations from this procedure would
be necessary, and it allowed the trial court discretion to deal with these
situations.24
3. Category Three
The final category within this classification uses an entirely different
means to reach a similar end. It holds: 1) the existence of surveillance is not
work product and is always discoverable;2 4 2) the contents of surveillance
are classified as work product, but this classification ceases if the surveillance
is used as evidence for any purpose;24 3) if the contents of the surveillance
are not used as evidence, the work product protection remains and is
overcome only upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship;247
and 4) the trial court has the discretion to allow the defendant to depose the
plaintiff as to her injuries before disclosing the contents of the surveil-
lance. m
This approach is best represented in the Florida case of Dodson v.
Persell."9 The Dodson court held that the existence of surveillance was
242. Id. at 478.
243. Id. The timing of the deposition of the plaintiff and the disclosure of the
existence of surveillance is critical, but rarely discussed, in cases granting the
defendant the right to depose the plaintiff. This case is the only one which attempted
to delineate an order for the events to occur. Id. Ultimately, even this court left the
ordering of events up to the discretion of the trial court. Id.
The order of the following events is critical: 1) the initial discovery request; 2)
the consent to be deposed; 3) the deposition of the plaintiff as to her injuries; 4) the
acknowledgement of the existence of the surveillance; 5) the production of the contents
of the surveillance; and 6) the date the surveillance begins and ends in relation to the
above events. No court has yet attempted to develop a uniform system for the
administration of these events. See infra notes 313-20 and accompanying text.
244. Jenkins, 350 A.2d at 478.




249. 390 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1980). For a case with a similar holding within this
category, see Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Loomis, 432 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).
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freely discoverable and was not classified, as work product."0 The court
stated that the surveillance, as relevant evidence, could not be allowed to be
hidden from the court2 1 The court thought that before a judge could
determine whether the contents are privileged, the surveillance's existence
must be acknowledged. z 2  The court stated the free discovery of the
existence of surveillance was in accord with the general policy behind
discovery.z  This policy was to facilitate a search for truth and justice, and
it could only be accomplished when all relevant facts were before the
court.2
4
The Dodson court stated that the surveillance contents' work product
protection "ceases once the materials or testimony are intended for trial
use."255  The court indicated the classification of the contents of the
surveillance as work product was entirely dependent on the intended use of
the materials. s If the surveillance contents were to be used only to assist
the attorney in trying the case, they remain classified as work product. 
7
However, if the surveillance contents were to be used as evidence, they ceased
to be work product and were subject to free discovery.z'
Unlike other variations within this category, which hold the work product
protection is inherently overcome when the surveillance materials are used as
evidence,259 the Dodson court said the work product classification simply
disappears when the materials are used as evidence.20 The Dodson court's
view that the work product classification disappears is equivalent to other
courts' findings of inherent substantial need and undue hardship.261 Even
if the surveillance is not used as evidence for any purpose, the Dodson court
said it would likely find exceptional circumstances overcoming the work






256. Id. ("More simply, if the materials are only to aid counsel in trying the case,
they are work product. But, if they will be used as evidence, the materials, including
films, cease to be work product and become subject to an adversary's discovery.").
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
260. Dodson, 390 So. 2d at 707. •
261. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. Apparently the Dodson court
is essentially performing a "substantial need and undue hardship" analysis and, instead
of "overcoming the work product protection," the Dodson court concludes the work
product status disappears. Dodson, 390 So. 2d at 707.
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product protection if the surveillance was "unique and otherwise unavailable,
and materially relevant to the cause's issues."'26
The court recognized that there was some merit in the defendant's
argument that the use of surveillance prevented fraud and overstated injuries
by the plaintiff.263 With an eye toward fairness, the court held that the
decision about the right to depose the plaintiff as to his injuries was within the
trial court's discretion.'
C. Surveillance as Work Product and Not Discoverable
A limited number of jurisdictions have held surveillance protected as
work product and not discoverable.265 The "work product and not discover-
able" classification holds both the existence and contents of surveillance
protected as work product, and the protection is not overcome by a showing
of substantial need and undue hardship.2 This classification reflects
current case law in Missouri.267 Only a few other jurisdictions have adopted
this approach.m
This was the approach taken by the United States District Court in Hikel
v. Abousy.26 9 In Hikel, the injured plaintiff did not contend she was entitled
to discover the contents of the surveillance. 7 She only sought discovery
of the existence of surveillance.271 The court balanced the plaintiff's need
to know of the existence of the surveillance against the defendant's potential
uses of the surveillance and held the existence nondiscoxerable. 2  The
court dismissed the plaintiff's contention that potential for settlement would
262. Dodson, 390 So. 2d at 707. An example the court gave was photographs of
the scene of the accident, with the scene now changed and not reproducible. Id.
These "exceptional circumstances" are likely the Dodson court's equivalent of
substantial need and undue hardship.
263. Id. at 708.
264. Id.
265. See infra note 268.
266. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 117 and Part II.
268. See, e.g., Macivor v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 87-6424-E, 1988 WL
156743 (D. Or. June 9, 1988); Hikel v. Abousy, 41 F.R.D. 152 (D. Md. 1966);
Kriskey v. Chestnut Hill Bus Co., No. CV87 0090900 S, 1990 WL 284343 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 9, 1990). But see Davis v. Daddona, No. CV89 0102503 S, 1990 WL
288643 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 1990) (finding surveillance discoverable).
269. 41 F.R.D. 152 (D. Md. 1966).
270. Id. at 154.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 155.
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be enhanced if the surveillance's existence was acknowledged, and stated that
if the injuries were genuine, the plaintiffs would not be concerned about
photos that confirmed their claims. 273 The court further held that if the
surveillance's nonexistence was acknowledged, it would give the plaintiff "free
rein in testifying without fear of impeachment" by surveillance. 4 The court
reasoned that in those cases where knowledge of the existence would
influence the plaintiff's testimony,.the nondiscovery of the existence would
likely make the plaintiff more careful in her testimony.275 In those cases
where the knowledge of the existence would not influence the plaintiff's
testimony, the information would have little value.2" A major criticism of
this decision is that the court, by refusing discovery requests for the existence
of surveillance, eliminated the plaintiff's opportunity to explore the possibility
that the surveillance contents could be misleading or distorted.277
V. SUGGESTED TREATMENT OF SURVEILLANCE UNDER MISSOURI'S
NEW DISCOVERY PROVISIONS
Both the existence and contents of surveillance materials should be
afforded work product protection as trial preparation material in Missouri.
Surveillance materials clearly meet the four requirements necessary to be
classified as work product.278 First, the surveillance film is a tangible
item.279 Second, other privileges have generally been unsuccessful in
protecting surveillance from discovery; therefore, surveillance is otherwise
discoverable.m Third, the surveillance is prepared by a representative of
the party.281 Fourth, the surveillance is prepared in anticipation of trial."s
Two factors support the proposition that surveillance is prepared in anticipa-
tion of trial. First, surveillance materials generally do not have a business
purpose other than assisting the defendant in litigation or preparation for
trial. 3 Second, surveillance is not typically begun until the personal injury
273. Id. at 154 n.1.
274. Id. at 154-55 n.1.
275. Id. at 155.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 59.
280. See supra notes 17, 18 and 60 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 45 and 61 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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suit has been filed.2" Thus, surveillance generally occurs a significant time
after the liability-causing event.28
McMillian held both the existence and contents of surveillance to be
work product.? When McMiIlian was decided, work product was defined
as any writing prepared or obtained in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial by the adverse party's attorney, surety, indenitor or
agent. 7  The definition is substantially the same under today's work
product provision, section 56.01(b)(3).m Therefore, under the modem work
product rules 9 and Missouri precedent,2 ° the existence and contents of
surveillance should be classified as work product.2 91
The work product protections should, however, be overcome by a
showing of substantial need and undue hardship in obtaining the substantial
equivalent.292 This conclusion is supported by several factors.293
The most significant factor is the plaintiff's ability to actually remember
the extent of every activity he has participated in.29 The only available
substitute for the surveillance materials is the plaintiff's memory and
284. See supra notes 87 and 89 and accompanying text; infra note 300 and
accompanying text.
285. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
287. Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400,406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting from
the old Mo. R. CIv. P. 57.01(b)). See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
288. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3). Work product is currently defined as
"documents and tangible things ... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
or for another party or by or for that other party's representative, including his
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent . . . ." Id.
289. See supra notes 278-85 and accompanying" text.
290. See, e.g., Porter v. Gottschall, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Mo. 1981)
(photos of scene of accident classified as work product, although protection overcome
by need and hardship); McMillian, 351 S.W.2d at 25 (existence and contents of
surveillance classified as work product).
291. But see McMullen & Foster, supra note 38, at 575. The authors suggest that
since Rule 56.01(b)(1) allows parties to discover the existence of documents related
to the lawsuit, the existence is not properly classified as work product. Id. This logic
is incorrect. All materials classified as work product under 56.01(b)(3) must be
"otherwise discoverable under subdivision (bX1) of this Rule 56.01." Mo. R. CIv. P.
56.01(b)(3). Therefore, the fact that the existence of the materials are discoverable
under (b)(1) is a necessary element in order for the existence to be classified as work
product, and not the reason it cannot be classified as work product as the authors seem
to suggest.
292. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
293. Id.
294. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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individual account of every physical activity he has engaged in since the
liability-creating event, or at least since the filing of the lawsuit.295  It is
unrealistic to think that the plaintiff's memory is a fair substitute-for the
film.2' The plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney undoubtedly had the
opportunity to discover the same information as depicted in the surveillance,
but it is not realistic to expect a party to conduct 24-hour surveillance on
himself to record any surveillance the other party may have obtained. The
surveillance is unique and its contents can only be discovered by viewing the
recording of the surveillance. 2 9 The likelihood that the plaintiff will not be
able to remember every event depicted in the surveillance film favors a
finding of substantial need for the surveillance materials and an undue
hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent. 298 A significant number of
jurisdictions have so held.29
A second factor is time lapse between the liability-causing event and the
surveillance. Personal injury surveillance is typically not begun until a lawsuit
is filed and the plaintiff makes his alleged injuries known to the defendant.
Generally, surveillance occurs a substantial period of time after the liability-
creating incident occurred.300 Additionally, there is typically a significant
length of time between the filing of the complaint and the trial date, thus
giving the defendant a large window of time in which to conduct surveil-
lance.30' These time lapses between the event giving rise to the injury and
the trial date increase the hardship on the injured plaintiff to recall every
activity in which he may have participated.3 2
A third factor is the likelihood surveillance will be misleading or
distorted if introduced at trial.30s The surveillance may depict the plaintiff
participating in an activity contrary to the plaintiff's alleged injuries, but fail
to depict the pain the plaintiff experienced. 3' Additionally, the surveillance





300. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate
Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1062 (1989). Typical products liability
or other tort cases may not be brought until years after the liability-creating event
occurs. Id.
301. Irving R. Kaufman, Reform For A System In Crisis: Alternative Dispute
Resolution In The Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 2 (1990).
302. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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may distort activities through camera angles, lighting, and film speed. °5
Without the opportunity to examine the film's contents and the photographer's
credentials, the plaintiff could not discover any distortions.' °
Finally, the policy behind pre-trial discovery supports overcoming the
work product protection.3 7 The purposes of pre-trial discovery are three-
fold: 1) to eliminate concealment and surprise;3" 2) to aid the litigants in
determining the facts prior to trial;31 and 3) to provide the litigants with
access to proper information to develop their case.31 ° In personal injury
suits, surveillance may be the most persuasive evidence available.31  The
discovery of surveillance materials prior to trial by the plaintiff expressly
meets these purposes.
3 12
If Missouri courts conclude the plaintiff has the right to obtain discovery
of surveillance, the defendant should be allowed to depose the plaintiff3
13
before acknowledging the existence of surveillance.31 4 Any request by the
plaintiff concerning surveillance should be accompanied with the plaintiff's
consent to be deposed as to the extent of injuries before the defendant is
required to acknowledge the surveillance's existence 1  After receiving the
plaintiff's consent to be deposed, the defendant should be given a thirty-day
305. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
308. State ex rel Anheuser v. Nolan, 692 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Combellick v. Rooks, 401 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Mo. 1966)).
309. Id. (citing Bethell v. Porter, 595 S.W.2d 369, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
310. Id.
311. See Jenkins v. Rainner, 350 A.2d 473,477 (N.J. 1976); LaMarca, supra note
1, at 1.
312. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
313. This right should be extended to include any other person whose deposition
would furnish a reasonable degree of protection to the defendant as to the certainty of
the injuries depicted in the surveillance. For example, any witnesses to the plaintiff's
actions depicted in the surveillance could be deposed. See Blyther v. Northern Lines,
Inc., 61 F.R.D. 610, 611-12 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
314. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Additionally, an interrogatory
asking for the identity of "persons with knowledge concerning discoverable facts"
would likely include any investigators conducting surveillance, and acknowledgement
of their existence would be the same as acknowledging the existence of the
surveillance itself. See supra note 5. Therefore, the defendant should be allowed to
answer the interrogatory: "Any possible additional persons with knowledge of
discoverable facts would concern surveillance and acknowledgment of their existence
or non-existence is conditional on consent to depose the plaintiff prior to acknowledge-
ment." See also Jenkins, 350 A.2d at 478.
1992]
35
Siemens: Siemens: Discoverability of Personal Injury
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
period to depose the plaintiff" 16 before the defendant must acknowledge the
existence of the surveillance materials and produce them.
If the defendant acknowledges the nonexistence of surveillance after
memorializing the plaintiff's injuries through deposition, and the defendant
then conducts surveillance on the plaintiff, the defendant has a duty to update
her responses to prior interrogatories and requests from the plaintiff.1 7 The
defendant should be given thirty days from the commencement of the
surveillance (or forty-five days prior to the scheduled trial date if sooner) to
supplement her answers to the plaintiff's previous interrogatories or re-
quests. 318 At that time, the defendant should be required to acknowledge the
existence and disclose the contents& of any surveillance accumulated to
date.319 No surveillance should be allowed to be conducted within forty-five
days of the scheduled trial date in order to provide some assurance to the
plaintiff that no last-minute surprises will arise.320
The proper way to implement these proposals would be through an
amendment, specifically dealing with surveillance materials, to Missouri Rule
of Civil Procedure 56. This amendment could provide that a party may obtain
discovery of the existence and contents of surveillance materials conducted on
the party seeking discovery, provided that the party seeking discovery consents
316. See supra note 243. This 30-day period should be sufficient to arrange for
the plaintiff's deposition, especially considering the plaintiff has motivation to expedite
his deposition in order to discover whether surveillance exists or not.
317. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(e).
318. This should be a sufficient period for the defendant to capture any activities
in which the plaintiff might be participating that are contrary to his alleged injuries.
Because the plaintiff will not know this surveillance has begun until 30 days after its
commencement, the defendant should be provided with candid photo opportunities.
319. The practical result of this is that if the defendant is considering conducting
surveillance when the plaintiff consents to a deposition, the defendant should conduct
this deposition in order to have the deposition available to impeach the plaintiff after
the subsequent surveillance is conducted.
320. To illustrate the most extreme possibility for the plaintiff under this scheme,
consider the following scenario: The plaintiff propounds interrogatories and requests
for production concerning surveillance, accompanied with a consent to be deposed, at
an early date in the trial preparation. The defendant deposes the plaintiff as to his
injuries 30 days later, and on the same date, responds that no surveillance exists.
Some time later, 75 days prior to the scheduled trial date, the defendant decides to
conduct surveillance on the plaintiff. The defendant has 30 days to update her
responses to the prior interrogatories and requests and conducts surveillance during this
entire period. Forty-five days prior to the trial, the defendant updates her responses
to the plaintiff's interrogatories and produces the surveillance. The plaintiff then has
45 days to examine the surveillance and prepare arguments pertaining to its use. No
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to be deposed by the party upon whom the discovery request has been made.
The deposition is limited to the, activities that might be depicted in the
surveillance of the party seeking discovery. The trial court has the discretion
to exclude statements in this deposition that are outside this limitation. After
receiving consent to be deposed from the party seeking discovery, the party
upon whom the discovery request has been made has 30 days to depose the
party seeking discovery. After the 30 days have expired, the party upon
whom the discovery request has been made must acknowledge the existence
or nonexistence of the surveillance and disclose the contents of such
surveillance. If, at any time thereafter, the party upon whom the discovery
request has been made conducts any surveillance on the party who requested
discovery of surveillance, the party upon whom the initial discovery request
was made has a duty to update the responses to the previous discovery request
within 30 days of the commencement of the surveillance, or within 45 days
of the scheduled trial date, whichever is sooner. No surveillance shall be
admissible as evidence if it has taken place within 45 days of the commence-
ment of the trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discoverability of surveillance materials is not uniform from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.32' Surveillance has a legitimate purpose in the
search for truth in personal injury suits.322 However, it can be abused and
create unfair prejudice against the plaintiff.31 Many of the jurisdictions that
allow for the discovery of surveillance render the surveillance's effectiveness
impotent. Missouri has yet to allow the discovery of surveillance materi-
als.3 24  By adopting the suggested treatment of surveillance materials,
Missouri can maintain the surveillance's effectiveness while curbing abuses
that may prejudice the defendant.
KENNETH E. SIEMENS
321. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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